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FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE




The last round of scholarship concerning the Constitution's war powers
was a product of the Indochina War.I Out of that era sprung the War
Powers Resolution of 1973,2 a significant statement by Congress which
sought to reclaim its eroded powers over the nation's commitment to armed
conflicts. Since 1973 and the withdrawal of American troops from Viet-
nam, concern and debate over the war powers has shifted decidedly toward
various scenarios involving nuclear weapons. Like much of the previous
debate over the war powers, the question of the respective constitutional
prerogatives of the elected branches to engage and manage a nuclear war is
probably not resolvable.3 Even so, it is an issue with enough importance to
command our attention toward sorting out the permissible constitutional
roles.
Although the War Powers Act brought some constitutional order to the
roles assigned to the two branches during pending or real hostilities, it is
seriously flawed. First, its provisions have often been ignored.4 In that re-
gard, some perhaps minor repairs are needed.5 More importantly, the Act's
grant of discretion to the President to commit our forces in a "national
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University. B.A., University of Nebraska, 1971; J.D., University of
Denver, 1974; M.S., University of Denver, 1982. The author would like to thank Daan Braveman
and Peter Raven-Hansen for helpful suggestions on early drafts of this paper. The author would
also like to thank Richard Thomas, a second year law student at Syracuse, for his invaluable
research assistance.
1. See generally T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1974); T. FRANCK & E. WEIS-
BAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS (1979); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION (1972); J. JAVITS, WHO MAKES WAR? (1973); Department of State, Office of Legal
Adviser, The Legality of United States Participation in Vietnam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1088 (1966);
Van Alystyne, Congress, the President and the Power to Declare War, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1972);
and Note, Congress, the President and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1771 (1968).
2. War Powers Resolution § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982). Originally H.J. Res. 542, the resolution was
adopted over a veto by President Nixon on November 7, 1973.
3. Scholarly debate continues because the Constitution permits either branch to claim the disputed
powers. Many believe that the Constitution grants the lion's share of the war powers to Congress.
See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 45-50; W. REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS (1981); A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS 3 (1976); Note, The Future of the War Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1410
(1984). Others claim the same or greater share was intended for the President. See Emerson, The
War Powers Resolution Tested: the President's Independent Defense Power, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 187, 209-13 (1975); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L.
REV. 833, 864-66 (1972).
4. For a good account of the role of the War Powers Act since 1973, see Note, supra note 3, at 1420-
29.
5. Id. at 1436-45. See generally Symposium: The War Powers Resolution, 17 LOY. L.A.L. REV. 579-
802 (1984).
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emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or pos-
sessions, or its armed forces" 6 sanctioned, or at least failed to negate, the
President's potentially broad power to unilaterally launch a first strike nu-
clear attack.7 The practical and legal problems come together in the follow-
ing scenario: Assume an attack on NATO forces in Western Europe. As
the conventional war widens, the President orders retaliation with conven-
tional forces without consulting Congress, within the War Powers Act
emergency provision.8 The conflict continues to escalate and the NATO
forces take heavy losses. The President decides to use theater nuclear weap-
ons in an effort to reverse the tide and decide the matter quickly. Still act-
ing under the War Powers Act, the President chooses not to consult
Congress before firing the nuclear weapons.9 Several questions arise: Does
such a decision-making scheme make sense? Does the President have the
constitutional power to fire nuclear weapons first in such a setting?' ° May
Congress act to limit the presidential prerogative over the first-use deci-
sion?" If Congress has the constitutional power to so limit the president,
what form may its role take? While all of the questions are interesting and
important, this article will attempt a tenative answer to only the last one.' 2
One way for Congress to share the first-use decision would be to pro-
hibit the President's first use unless both houses in full pass an expedited
emergency resolution approving it. However, it may be unrealistic to in-
volve the whole Congress in such a shared decision. While urgency and
expediency may not require a decision in minutes, the nation may be irre-
trievably damaged if days must pass for Congress as a whole to debate and
then decide the first-use question.' 3 While various ways to share the first-
use decision exist, 14 one potentially effective device was first proposed as a
bill in Congress by the Federation of American Scientists in 1975. The FAS
6. War Powers Resolution § 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982).
7. Whether the emergency language directly sanctioned or simply failed to negate presidential power
turns on whether such a power is a part of the Article II power. See infra note 10. The Senate
version of the War Powers Resolution would have explicitly set out the instances where the Presi-
dent could commit troops without statutory authorization. See Glennon, The War Powers Resolu-
tion: Sad Record, Dismal Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 657 (1984).
8. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1982).
9. The President would likely rely on the § 2(c) emergency language. Of course, it may also be as
likely that the President would consult or even seek the approval of Congress. The point is that he
would not be required to do so under the War Powers Resolution.
10. It may be that, under the Constitution, Congress must affirmatively authorize the President's first
use of nuclear weapons. See W. REVELEY III, supra note 3, at 190-95.
11. On the question of who ultimately has the power to order the first use of nuclear weapons, the
Constitution appears to permit either branch to claim the power. Good arguments have been
made on both sides. See id. at 170-89. The weight of opinion, however, supports the notion that
Congress may affirmatively condition or even prohibit the President's first-use decision so long as
such action does not interfere with the President's generally recognized authority to "repel sudden
attacks." See generally L. HENKIN, W. REVELEY III, and A. SOFAER, supra note 3. Such meas-
ures would be based upon the Framers' intent that the initiation of war should require the concur-
rence of the President and Congress and upon a recognition of the modem reality that a first use of
nuclear weapons would constitute a declaration of war or at least an escalation of hostilities so
grave that Congress should be allowed to participate in the decision.
12. The strategic questions are addressed in Stone, Presidential First Use is Unlawful, 56 FOREIGN
POL'Y 94 (1984).
13. Id at 108.
14. Options include requiring some form of congressional consultation instead of approval, or a re-
quirement that the President consult with certain executive branch officials before first use.
[Vol. 13:1
First Use of Nuclear Weapons
bill would prohibit presidential first use absent a prior declaration of war
unless a select joint committee of Congress authorizes such use.
The text of the FAS provision provides that:
[i]n any given conflict or crisis, whatsoever, and notwithstanding any
other authority, so long as no nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass
destruction) have been used by others, the President shall not use nuclear
weapons without consulting with, and securing the assent of a majority of, a
committee composed of the:
President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Speaker of the House of
Representatives
Majority and Minority Leader of the House of Representatives
Majority and Minority Leader of the Senate
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of:
Senate Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
House Committee on International Relations
15Joint Committee on Atomic Energy...
In addition, the proposal would not be operative if Congress suspends it by
a subsequent declaration of war.'
6
Ironically, of the alternatives to the present uncertain constitutional
calculus-an absolute bar to presidential first use or an expedited two house
approval requirement, both of which are extreme and perhaps unwise or
unconstitutional-the committee approval mechanism poses the most seri-
ous constitutional problems, given the 1983 Supreme Court decision in Im-
migration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.'7 In Chadha, the Court
declared unconstitutional the legislative veto, where "legislative" action was
taken with less than the full bicameral Congress.18
Chadha was an East Indian from Kenya. Having overstayed his student
visa, he was subject to deportation.' 9 However, an Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service (INS) officer suspended Chadha's deportation in 1974,
acting under Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) provisions which
provided that either the House or the Senate could veto such suspensions.2"
The House passed a resolution vetoing Chadha's suspended deportation late
in 1975.21 A new INS deportation order followed in 1976.22
Chadha appealed the order, challenging the constitutionality of the stat-
utory veto provision. 23 The case eventually reached the Supreme Court
24
which ruled in Chadha's favor. The result was not surprising, given the
15. The FAS bill is reprinted in W. REVELEY III, supra note 3, at 356, n. 22. The Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy is now defunct.
16. Stone, supra note 12, at 107. The proposal would also require annual reports from the President to
the committee. Id
17. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
18. Id. at 958-59. Action taken without full bicameral participation and presentment to the President
was found to violate Article I of the Constitution. Id. at 946-59.
19. Id. at 923.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
21. H.R. 726, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 40,800 (1975).
22. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 928.
23. Chadha first lodged an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
1986]
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unique deprivation of fairness for the individual imposed by the INA
scheme, 25 coupled with our constitutional tradition of providing fair pro-
cess before imposing important changes in an individual's legal status.26
However, the Chadha case has created an uproar because the Chief Jus-
tice's opinion for the Court reasoned by generalizing from the facts of
Chadha to apply the formal presentment and bicameralism requirements of
Article I to all resolutions which are "exercise[s] of legislative power," de-
fined as "action[s] that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative
branch."27 Thus, the sweeping language in the Burger decision has been
used to free the Chadha opinion from its context and generalize its applica-
tion to any veto which alters "legal rights." This apparently extreme reac-
tion is supported by Justice Powell's concurring statement that the opinion
"apparently will invalidate every use of the legislative veto. The breadth of
this holding gives one pause."' 28 Similarly, Justice White's dissent stated
that "[tjoday the Court . . .sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other
statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto,' " on
"such varied matters as war powers and agency rulemaking. '29  Thus,
Chadha creates the distinct possibility, if not certainty, that all congres-
sional assent requirements which do not clear the presentment and bicamer-
alism hurdles are unconstitutional.
In short, the committee device would not, apparently, comply with the
"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure,"30 which
the Chadha Court found to be the constitutional prescription for any exer-
cise of legislative power. Avoiding the full bicameral deliberative process,
the committee approval mechanism would allow Congress to act without
the necessary "cumbersomeness and delays"'" which the Framers intended
as both a check upon the "hydraulic" tendencies of the legislative branch
vis-a-vis the other branches as well as a check upon the legislature's own
propensity32 for unwise and hasty action.
33
This article seeks to determine the extent to which Chadha would
render unconstitutional the committee approval mechanism involved in the
first-use proposal. The short answer is that neither Chadha nor the Consti-
tution precludes the first-use proposal. The following case will be made for
the committee approval mechanism: First, the committee device is a consti-
tutionally permissible clarification of Congress' Article I war powers, which
24. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the INS veto provision in
1980. INS v. Chadha, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. The only exceptions from the Article I requirements are those mentioned in the Constitution:
impeachment, the senate's advise and consent role, and matters internal to Congress.
26. Justice Powell concurred in an opinion laced with concerns about individual rights. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 952.
28. Id. at 959.
29. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
30. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
31. Id. at 959.
32. Id. at 948-50.
33. See Consumer Energy Council of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 673 F.2d
425, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (discussing value of President's veto in
checking hasty or unwise legislative action).
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serves as a political accommodation between the Executive and Congress in
an area of shared powers. Second, the committee "veto" proposed by FAS
is not a legislative veto and is thus not a fortiori unconstitutional after
Chadha. Third, whether the committee mechanism is characterized as a
legislative veto, it does not suffer the formal constitutional defects which
caused the Court to invalidate the INS veto; nor would it violate separation
of powers principles.
Like a few other unique exercises of the legislative power,34 the first-use
proposal includes the committee approval mechanism as an integral compo-
nent of an overall effort to define or clarify conflicts and ambiguities in the
Constitution regarding the allocation of power between the elected
branches. As such, the clarification of the constitutional prescription for a
first-use decision is not ordinary legislation.35 It defines the Constitution's
terms and "delineates structures and processes''36 and, as such, it may be
viewed as "quasi-constitutional in nature."37 As a clarification, it reminds
the President of his limited war powers.38
THE COMMITEE MECHANISM: A PERMISSIBLE EXERCISE
OF CONGRESS' ARTICLE I WAR POWER
Unless Congress could not constitutionally pass the initial prohibition
against presidential first use,39 ample authority supports the committee ap-
proval mechanism as a "necessary and proper"4exercise of the Article I
war power. Granting that the current attitude of the Court is that all "leg-
islative" acts must strictly adhere to the literal, formal requirements of pre-
sentment and bicameralism in Article I,41 a constitutional basis still exists
for a more flexible, less formal approach to the analysis of congressional
power in the context of foreign affairs.
The war power is unique in our Constitution in part because it is split
among the elected branches.42 As one manifestation of the separation of
powers, the intentional division of the war powers may require more shar-
ing and tolerance of mechanisms for sharing than is required for authority
34. See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982); The Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, titles I-IX, 88 Stat. 297-332 (codified in scattered
sections of 1, 2, and 31 U.S.C.); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 1706(b) (1951 & West Supp. 1985).
35. Early authority for the distinction may be found in the Supreme Court's 1798 decision in Hollings-
worth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. 378 (1798), which held that the proposed eleventh amendment need not
be presented to the President, because presentment "applies only to the ordinary cases of legisla-
tion .. . Id. at 381 n.* Because Article I requires presentment of "Every Order, Resolution or
Vote" of the Congress, Hollingsworth supports the notion that some legislation is not of that spe-
cies. I do not wish to rely on Hollingsworth for too much, although Professor Carter has argued
convincingly from Hollingsworth for the existence of a category of "extraordinary legislative
power" in his attempt to save the legislative vetoes in the War Powers Resolution from Chadha.
See Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 129-32 (1984).
36. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 361 (1985).
37. Id.
38. See generally Stone, supra note 12.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
41. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. A "legislative" act is one "that had the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties and relations of persons . . . outside the legislative branch." Id. at 952.
42. U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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that is more clearly allocated to one branch.4 3 The proposition that the ex-
ercise of foreign affairs power may earn more deference from a reviewing
court than the exercise of domestic power is not novel and not without
strong support:" "That there are differences between them, and that these
differences are fundamental, may not be doubted. The two classes of pow-
ers are different, both in respect of their origin and their nature."45 Justice
Sutherland's expansive, but still authoritative declaration from his opinion
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.46 that sovereignty provides
an extra-constitutional source of foreign affairs power4 7 has laid the ground-
work for a double standard: Certain governmental arrangements of power
which might be invalid in the context of domestic affairs might be tolerated
in the foreign affairs context.4" In Lichter v. United States,49 the Court re-
stated the double standard in upholding the Renegotiation Act as authority
for recovery by the government of "excessive profits" taken by private war
goods contractors during World War II. The Court explained that "while
the constitutional structure and controls of our Government are our guides
equally in war and peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes of
the entire instrument fully in mind."5 The Court in Lichter was acutely
aware of the dangers of formalism in the foreign affairs context and recog-
nized that preoccupation with the "letter" of the Constitution could under-
mine its purposes:
[1]t is of the highest importance that the fundamental purposes of the Con-
stitution be kept in mind and given effect in order that, through the Consti-
tution, the people of the United States may in time of war as in peace bring
to the support of these purposes the full force of their united action. In time
of crisis nothing could be more tragic and less expressive of the intent of the
people than so to construe their Constitution that by its own terms it would
substantially hinder rather than help them in defending their national
safety. 
5 1
Without pushing this doctrine too far, it may at least be maintained that the
Constitution should be interpreted more flexibly in the foreign affairs
context. 52
Of course, the first-use proposal concerns the special case of the war
powers, a unique and specific foreign affairs context. Even if it is true, as
Chief Justice Burger wrote in Chadha, that it is "crystal clear from the
43. As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in striking down a
legislative veto in a regulatory program, "[T]he foreign affairs veto presents unique problems since
in that context there is the additional question whether Congress or the President or both have the
inherent power to act." Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion, 673 F.2d 425, 459 (D.C Cir. 1982), affid merm sub noma. Process Gas Consumers Group v.
Consumers Energy Council of America, 463 U.S 1216 (1983).
44. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 15-16.
45. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
46. Id.
47. See L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 19-26; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315-18.
48. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315; L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 18.
49. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
50. Id. at 782.
51. Id. at 779-80 (emphasis added).
52. L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 23 (foreign affairs powers "are not subject to doctrines of interpreta-
tion and limitation applicable to powers granted by the Constitution. . . [such as] 'separation of
powers' ").
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records of the Convention, contemporaneous writings and debates, that the
Framers ranked other values higher than efficiency,""3 it is also true that
those values do not rank higher than the concern for expedience in execut-
ing our national defense manifested in Congress' war powers. Efficiency
and expediency in time of foreign crisis may be necessary for achieving the
Constitution's ultimate purposes.54 The committee approval mechanism is
a realistic expedient for fulfilling the important constitutional purpose of
national security while satisfying the Constitution's concern with tyranny
by insuring that the nation not be involved in war by one person's
decision.55
In the parlance of Article I, the committee approval mechanism may be
justified as a delegation of Congress' power to declare war when the full,
two-house procedure simply is not possible. As the Court in Curtiss-
Wright5 6 recognized, "not only . . .is the federal power over external af-
fairs in origin and essential character different from that over internal af-
fairs, but participation in the exercise of power is significantly limited."57
This limitation is especially true of the decision concerning first-use of nu-
clear weapons, which "may not be so immediate an issue that one decision
maker [i.e. the President alone] need be given authority to decide it" but
which "is a time-urgent matter and does not permit the usual congressional
procedures."58 Thus, as the Court in Lichter concluded, "[a] constitutional
power implies a power of delegation of authority under it sufficient to effect
its purposes."59 Without the power to delegate its approval decision to a
congressional committee, Congress may not be able to exercise its power to
participate in the first-use decision at all.'
While it is true that Justice Sutherland's essay on the foreign affairs
powers in Curtiss- Wright was far broader than what was necessary to decide
the case, his endorsement of Congress' broad delegation to the President
has special importance in the context of the first-use proposal because his
opinion was signed by six other Justices during an era when most of them
would have objected to the delegation in a domestic affairs case.61 Further-
more, recent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed Curtiss-Wright as an
authority for the continuing judicial deference provided exercises of the for-
eign affairs power.62
Indeed, recent delegation and foreign affairs cases indicate that at a time
when broad delegations in domestic affairs cases are again being questioned
53. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958-59.
54. See Lichter, 334 U.S. at 779.
55. The relationship of the first-use proposal to the prevention of tyranny is discussed infra at notes
113 to 140 and accompanying text.
56. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
57. Id. at 319.
58. Stone, supra note 12, at 108.
59. Lichter, 334 U.S. at 778.
60. This is true, granting the impossibility of participation by the entire body. It has been suggested
but never held that the war power may not be delegable at all. See National Cable Television Ass'n
v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
61. See L. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 25.
62. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981);
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984), reh'g denied, 105 S. Ct. 285 (1984).
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by some of the Justices, the Court has continued to find creative ways to
save extraordinarily vague delegations when the challenged delegation in-
volves foreign affairs. In the Court's 1980 Benzene decision,63 which threw
out an OSHA regulation of occupational exposure to benzene," a plurality
narrowly construed the OSHA grant of authority and argued that the con-
struction of the statute urged by the government would have represented an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.65 Justice Rehnquist con-
curred on the theory that the congressional directive that OSHA regulate
toxic substances in the workplace "to the extent feasible ' 66 was too vague
and thus violative of the nondelegation doctrine.67 In the same opinion,
Justice Rehnquist cited Curtiss- Wright68 as authority for the proposition
that broader delegations should be tolerated in foreign affairs cases.69
Then, in two decisions in 1981, Justice Rehnquist voted with the Court
to sustain executive actions concerning foreign affairs only after some espe-
cially creative analysis to find delegated authority from Congress. In Haig
v. Agee,7" the Court sustained the Secretary of State's authority to revoke a
passport when the holder's activities in foreign countries posed a perceived
threat to the nation's national security or foreign interests.7 ' All parties
agreed that Congress had not expressly granted the Executive the authority
to revoke Agee's passport. Instead, the delegation was found by evidence of
congressional silence and thus constructive acquiesence in a longstanding
executive policy or construction regarding passport revocations expressed
in regulations.72 In short, the delegation was implied where it could not be
expressly found.73
A few weeks later the Court relied on a similar theory to uphold the
President's power to suspend the claims of American nationals against Iran
pending in American courts in the wake of settling the Iranian hostage cri-
sis. In Dames & Moore v. Regan,74 Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the
Court again conceded the absence of any express authority delegated from
Congress to authorize the President's suspension of claims.75 Again, the
court found authority for the President's actions in congressional ac-
quiesence and "the general tenor of Congress' legislation in this area. "76
Thus, special efforts are being made to find ways to endorse the exercise
of foreign affairs powers where a close reading of the Constitution would
63. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Benzene Case].
64. Id. at 662.
65. Id. at 646.
66. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)(1982).
67. Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 671.
68. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
69. Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 684 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
70. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 291, 306.
73. In Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984), the Court followed the trend of the 1981 cases in
sustaining a treasury regulation aimed at restricting travel by Americans to Cuba by finding im-
plicit authority to so regulate from Congress. Once again, Justice Renquist's opinion for the Court
relied on Curtiss-Wright and the greater judicial deference due in foreign affairs cases. Id. at 3039.
74. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
75. Id. at 677.
76. Id. at 678.
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cast doubt on the legitimacy of the challenged action. It is true that the
foreign affairs delegations discussed above are distinguishable from the first-
use proposal for lack of a record of the equivalent "acquiesence" from the
President in the first-use context and the absence of any real dispute over
which branch holds the underlying substantive power in those cases. The
Court has nonetheless demonstrated, however, a consistent record of bend-
ing over backwards to sustain the exercise of foreign affairs powers and
delegations of those powers.77
If there is a delegation problem with the release mechanism, it is not the
usual one of too much delegation or delegation without standards.7" Quite
to the contrary, the committee approval device may be viewed as a remedy
or prescription for the rigidity of an absolute prohibition upon the execu-
tive. The delegation problem presented here is the transfer of power to a
single committee.
In AFGE v. Pierce,79 the D.C. Circuit spoke of an appropriations com-
mittee approval device as being, if not a legislative veto,8 ° "nothing more or
less than a grant of legislative power to two congressional committees."'"
The court found this delegation to be "plainly violative" of the formal pro-
cess requirements of Article I, "the only method through which legislation
may be enacted."8 2 The AFGE opinion has been effectively criticized 3 for
failing, like Chadha, to distinguish between measures which check the Chief
Executive and those that check an agency to which power has been dele-
gated.8 4 In any event, to the extent that its holding constrains delegations
77. The Court's record is not made inconsistent by its decision in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), that President Truman acted without statutory authority in his take-
over of a steel mill to avert a strike during the Korean War. Youngstown does not undercut the
record of special deference in foreign affairs cases because in that case Congress expressly consid-
ered and rejected granting the President the authority he sought to exercise. The Court relied on
Congress' intent in rejecting the President's claim. See infra text accompanying notes 177-80.
Thus, the distinctions referred to in the text may be unimportant if Congress takes affirmative
action.
78. See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 51-63
(1985).
79. AFGE v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 306.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Strauss, Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative
Veto Decision, 1983 DUKE L. J. 789, 812-15.
84. Id. Professor Strauss' argument to preserve what he calls "the political veto" has not been followed
by the post-Chadha opinions of the lower courts. See, e.g., The Reorganization Act cases: EEOC
v. CBS, 743 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.
1984); Muller Opitical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984). In the AFGE decision, how-
ever, Judges Wald and Mikva wrote separately to argue for an en banc hearing of the case. In their
argument they cautioned against the one-dimensional approach to the analysis of veto provisions
taken by the panel in AFGE:
The statutory provision invalidated in this case-requiring that both the Senate and
House Appropriations Committees approve any expenditure of funds "used prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1983, to plan, design, implement, or administer any reorganization of [HUD]"-is
easily distinguishable from the legislative vetoes previously found to be unconstitutional by
this court. . . . [T]he present case requires a different analysis of the constitutional inter-
play between the two branches.
We write separately to underscore our concern that language in the panel's opinion not
be read to foreclose careful consideration in subsequent cases of historical experience, prac-
tical working relationships, and the deference due Congress when it established its own
procedures under the Constitution. For example, we note that both the Reorganization Act
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of legislative power to committees, 5 AFGE is easily distinguishable from
the first-use committee mechanism on the basis of the first-use mechanism's
foreign affairs context,86 the absence of any real presentment problem,87 and
its separation of powers implications. 8 Further, it is more likely that the
appropriations committees' authority was voided on presentment and per-
haps bicameralism grounds, not on delegation principles. 89 Nothing in
AFGE or any other case suggests that a grant of legislative power to a com-
mittee violates any rule against delegations. With old and rare and inappli-
cable exceptions, 90 the courts have upheld all congressional delegations.9'
If delegation has any meaning today, it is in the context of regulation
and administration. 92 As Professor Strauss has said, albeit in the context of
the budget process: "That a congressional committee ... determines
whether [the President may act] . .. seems ...unexceptionable in the
world of continuing executive-legislative interaction . . . . In such a con-
tinuing relationship, limiting one participant to episodic, formal, even
clumsy acts is likely to produce rigidity and a covetousness about power
that will hamper the effective conduct of government and may weaken the
presidency far more than the alternative." 93 The committee mechanism in
the nuclear weapons area may be as likely to forestall the "rigidity and
covetousness" as in the budget process. This collaborative arrangement, if
enacted, should not be confused with those arrangments for which Con-
gress may be properly criticized for delegating too much power and passing
the buck on difficult decisions. Instead, the delegation is to a committee
which may, for the first time, be able to provide Congress with an effective
voice in deciding whether to grant power to an already powerful President
who may require more power under certain exigent circumstances. The
committee approval condition preserves the constitutional balance while ac-
complishing the essential delegation necessary for wartime decisionmaking.
of 1977, . . . and the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974, . . . include
provisions permitting either house of Congress to disapprove of proposed executive actions.
We are convinced that these and similar statutes cannot simply be invalidated under the
reasoning of our prior opinions without detailed examination of how such arrangements
operate and what they are designed to accomplish.. . .Various factors-whether related to
the subject area covered by the statute or the particular procedures mandated-remain to
be considered in the specific context of future cases. Courts should examine closely the
constitutional issues raised by each legislative review provision before invalidating on a pro
forma basis all statutes that provide for after-the-fact congressional oversight.
AFGE, 697 F.2d at 308-09 (Citations omitted).
85. AFGE, 697 F.2d at 307.
86. See Stone, supra note 12, at 108; E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984
271-77 (1984).
87. See infra notes 110 to 113 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 157 to 180 and accompanying text.
89. AFGE, 697 F.2d at 307.
90. See generally R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 78, at 51-63.
91. See, e.g., Benzene Case, 448 U.S. 607 (1980); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415
U.S. 336 (1974); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
92. Strauss, supra note 83, at 816 n.102.
93. Id. at 816.
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THE FIRST-USE COMMITTEE APPROVAL MECHANISM: NOT
A LEGISLATIVE VETO
The legislative veto has many forms and has been variously character-
ized. Generally, a legislative veto may be defined as "an effort by Congress,
by one house of Congress, or even by a single committee or chairman to
retain control over the execution or interpretation of laws after enact-
ment."' 94 More specifically, the veto is a "clause in a statute which says that
a particular executive action. . . will take effect only if Congress does not
nullify it by resolution within a specific period of time."95 The legislative
veto has three essential elements:
1) A statutory delegation of power to the Executive;
2) An exercise of that power by the Executive;
3) A power reserved by the Congress to nullify that exercise of
authority.
96
Judge Breyer has characterized "the veto's function as a legislative com-
promise of a fight for delegated power."97 "[S]ometimes," he says, the veto
compromises "important substantive conflicts embedded deeply in the Con-
stitution."98 Although Judge Breyer's functional characterization would
likely include the first-use committee approval mechanism as a legislative
veto, it does not fit his own definition.
First, the committee mechanism does not involve any initial statutory
delegation to the Executive. Instead, the proposal contains an initial prohi-
bition: "so long as no nuclear weapons have been used by others, the Presi-
dent shall not use nuclear weapons . . . . " In a pre-Chadha decision,
AFGE v. Pierce, 100 the D.C. Circuit recognized a distinction between a stat-
utory delegation followed by a committee veto and an initial prohibition
followed by a committee authorization. 1 AFGE v. Pierce involved a HUD
appropriations measure which provided that none of the appropriated funds
"may be used prior to January 1, 1983, to plan, design, implement, or ad-
minister any reorganization of the Department without the prior approval
of the Committees on Appropriations." 102 The court recognized that the
spending condition is not "naturally" characterizable as a "legislative veto
in the usual sense," but rather that the directive is simply a grant of legisla-
tive power to a committee.' 0 3 In other words, the D.C. Circuit recognized
that the provision contained an initial prohibition rather than a delegation,
followed by a resolution of approval rather than disapproval. As already
discussed, a grant of legislative power to a committee poses a discrete con-
stitutional issue.' But such a provision is not a legislative veto. Function-
94. B. CRAIG, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO: CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF REGULATION 1 (1983).
95. Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L. J. 785, 785 (1984).
96. Id. at 786.
97. Id. at 787.
98. Id.
99. See FAS proposal, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
100. 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
101. Id. at 306.
102. Id. at 304.
103. Id. at 306.
104. See supra notes 78 to 94 and accompanying text.
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ally, the committee approval proposal is like a statute that prohibits the
President from using nuclear weapons where they have not been used first
by others, while providing that the statute may be amended by committee
to allow the President first-use authority. 0 5
Second, the FAS proposal does not provide for a subsequent resolution
of disapproval or a nullification of previously delegated authority. Unlike
the legislative veto, the committee action here would be a subsequent reso-
lution of approval, not disapproval. Further, the approval would be initi-
ated by the President. Aside from the problems associated with the exercise
of approval power by a committee instead of the full Congress,' 0 6 joint reso-
lutions of approval are generally accepted as a constitutional alternative to
the legislative veto."0 7 This committee approval procedure, therefore, does
not involve any withdrawal of authorization but rather a new authorization,
a lifting of a congressionally-imposed restriction. 10 8
Since the committee approval mechanism involves neither an initial del-
egation of power to the President, nor a subsequent withdrawal of delegated
power without presentment, this proposal for congressional participation in
the first-use decision should not be characterized as a legislative veto and is
not unconstitutional per se after Chadha. It remains to be proved, however,
that the committee approval mechanism does not share any of the same
constitutional infirmities as the legislative veto and that it is consistent with
the commands of separation of powers.
THE FIRST-USE COMMITEE APPROVAL MECHANISM:
NOT VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE I OR
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
It is necessary to examine the issues in Chadha and separation of powers
independently because the Chadha holding is based on form and form
alone-the literal requirements of Article I. Chadha is not based on the
function of the veto and its impact on the purposes of separation of powers,
as it perhaps could and should have been. " In any case, there are no Arti-
cle I nor separation of powers flaws in the FAS proposal.
Presentment
The first of two "formal" concerns which guided the Chadha Court's
decision is the Article I, section 7, clause 3 requirement that every act of
105. See Carter, supra note 35, at 133. In effect, new law would be created by the President seeking and
obtaining Committee approval.
106. See supra notes 78 to 94 and accompanying text.
107. See Breyer, supra note 95, at 789; Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1084-87 (1985). For examples of proposed substitutions of
approval resolutions for legislative vetoes, see Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Executive
and Agency Actions after Chadha 'The Son of Legislative Veto' Lives, 72 GEO. L. J. 801, 806
(1984); see also L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESI-
DENT 178-83 (1985). Unlike simple and concurrent resolutions, joint resolutions are presented to
the President. The first use committee mechanism likewise satisfies presentment because the statu-
tory restriction could be lifted only at the President's initiative.
108. AFGE, 697 F.2d at 306.
109. See generally Strauss, supra note 83.
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legislation be presented to the President for his approval."I° The legislative
veto did not fulfill this requirement because the veto had the effect of alter-
ing statutorily created authority without presenting the proposed alteration
to the President.11-' The committee approval mechanism in the FAS propo-
sal, however, does not violate this formal requirement of presentation to the
President. Unlike the legislative veto, the committee approval procedure,
when actually exercised, would not produce legislation without the Presi-
dent's participation.112 By definition, any exercise of the approval mecha-
nism would be an affirmative act, initiated by the President. Without the
affirmative authorization from the committee, the original statutory prohi-
bition on first use would remain in effect. The committee approval device is
merely the procedure by which the President might obtain a release from
the prohibition. The President could "veto" the first-use authorization sim-
ply by not acting upon it; that is, by not employing nuclear weapons despite
the authorization. Thus, the committee approval procedure is consistent
with Chadha's formal concern about presentment.
Bicameralism
The second component of the Chadha holding is the bicameralism re-
quirement of Article I, sections one and seven.' 3 Acknowledging that the
one-house veto was a convenient and efficient device,1 4 the Court found
that it nonetheless was inconsistent with the Framers' conscious decision to
"impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, ineffi-
cient, even unworkable" in order to check "arbitrary governmental
acts."1' 5 It is clear that a committee approval procedure, while involving
members of both houses, nevertheless lacks bicameralism in the sense that
neither house is fully involved in the legislative act.1 6 Such a procedure, to
be sure, would not assure "that the legislative power would be exercised
only after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings." "7
At first view these objections would seem fatal to the committee release
device. However, there are two bases for excepting the FAS proposal from
formal bicameralism requirements. One basis is the Court's own record in
separation of powers cases.18 While in a few recent cases the Court has
110. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946-48.
Ill. Id. at 952.
112. The fact that the committee authorization would run directly to the President rather than to an
agency, is significant. In AFGE, the D.C. Circuit found that a committee approval mechanism did
implicate the presentment requirement. However, there the committee authorization ran directly
to an agency (HUD), not to the President himself. 697 F.2d at 306-07. A committee was empow-
ered to release a congressionally imposed restriction on funds for reorganization of the agency
without any presidential involvement-thus the violation of presentment. By contrast, in the pro-
posed first-use context the President would of course have the final say on whether the release of
the congressionally imposed prohibition would actually be realized, i.e. in a nuclear strike ordered
by the President.
113. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-51.
114. Id. at 958.
115. Id. at 958-59.
116. AFGE, 697 F.2d at 306.
117. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
118. See generally cases discussed in L. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 89-123; see also W. REVELEY III,
supra note 3, at 206-12; L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 200-04 (1972); see also supra notes
62 to 77 and accompanying text.
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exhibited a well-documented tendency to opt for the simple if often unreal-
istic approach to separation of powers that precludes one branch from shar-
ing tasks that resemble the obligations of another branch, 1 9 it has generally
applied a more flexible approach in its infrequent decisions of separation
issues. Especially in areas of shared powers, such as the war powers, where
the potential for conflict is greatest, Justice Jackson's famous formula for
resolving such conflicts,' 20 stated in the 1952 Youngstown case, 12 ' has
guided the Court. 22  In essence, in situations involving shared powers, if
Congress acts, it wins. 123 This functional approach to the analysis of the
power allocation question was applied in 1981 in Dames & Moore v. Re-
gan. 124 There, the Court declared that the Congress had acted through an
implicit delegation by acquiesence which legitimated the President's cur-
tailing of American claims against Iran in the wake of resolving the hostage
crisis. 12' Then, just this past term, the Court departed from its formal ap-
proach to separation of powers in a domestic affairs case. In Thomas v.
Union Carbide,126 the Court abandoned its rigid approach to analyzing the
relationship of Articles I and III which it had endorsed only three years
earlier in the Northern Pipeline decision. 127  Proclaiming "practical atten-
tion to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories,"' 2z
the Court held that Article III does not bar Congress from requiring bind-
119. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 625-40 (1984).
120. 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all
that Congress can delegate. [footnote omitted] In these circumstances, and in these only,
may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is
held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Govern-
ment as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an
Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who
might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of author-
ity, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain
exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject. [footnote omitted] Presidential claim to power at once so conclusive and preclu-
sive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by
our constitutional system.
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
121. Id. Only Justices Black and Douglas rejected the "twilight zone" premise in Youngstown.
122. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654, 674.
123. That is, in "the twilight zone" of shared power, legislation, or perhaps something less than legisla-
tion, is effective to resolve the power allocation question. See generally Watson, supra note 107, at
1084-86.
124. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
125. Id. at 678-88.
126. 105 S. Ct. 3325 (1985).
127. Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
128. Union Carbide, 105 S. Ct. at 3336.
First Use of Nuclear Weapons
ing arbitration with limited judicial review of compensation disputes among
registrants in a pesticide registration scheme. 29
Thus, the popularity of formalism in deciding separation cases may be
waning. In any event, the formalism of Chadha is unlikely to apply in the
war powers context. 130  Moreover, the courts have steadfastly refused to
become involved in defining the limits of the congressional war power,
3 '
and have only rarely invalidated a statute which arguably invaded executive
powers, except where the Article II power is stated clearly in the text.'
32
A second basis for excepting the FAS proposal from formal bicamera-
lism requirements is that such requirements have considerably less rele-
vance in the foreign affairs context than in the domestic context. Thus
there is even less reason for a bicameralism constraint in the context of the
war powers and a first-use decision. Two important concerns which led the
Framers to adopt the bicameral requirement of Article I are relevant to the
committee mechanism. 133 The first, and perhaps the most important, was
the fear of legislative hegemony. The Court in Chadha relied upon the
comments of James Wilson during the convention debates 134 and the obser-
vations of Hamilton in the Federalist135 to the effect that legislative tyranny
was greatly to be feared and only to be averted by dividing the legislative
power so as to make its exercise more difficult and cumbersome.'
36
While the Court's emphasis upon this concern may fit the INS veto pro-
vision at issue in Chadha, it exemplifies the pitfalls of stating broad consti-
tutional principles based on an extreme case. Although it is generally true
that the Framers believed "that the powers conferred on Congress were the
powers to be most carefully circumscribed,"'' 37 it is also true that in the area
of war powers the legislature was not the branch whose potential for tyr-
anny was most feared. It was the Executive, not Congress, whose potential
129. Id. at 3336-37.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 36-74.
131. See Note, supra note 3, at 1415-16.
132. Carter, supra note 35, at 124-25, n. 111 (recognizing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) as a
possible exception). In any event, I claim that the committee would be given an Article I, not an
Article II power.
133. The remaining two purposes for the bicameralism requirement are related and are inapplicable to
the first-use context for the same reasons. First, the Framers feared that "special interests could be
favored at the expense of public needs." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950. The problem with exercising
legislative power by a committee, therefore, is that it would invite the elevation of parochial inter-
ests and the undermining of the constitutional functions of a national and two-house legislative
system. Second, the Framers were also concened, although not of one mind, over the apprehen-
sions of the smaller states. Those states feared that a commonality of interest among the larger
states would work to their disadvantage; representatives of the larger States, on the other hand,
were skeptical of a legislature that could pass laws favoring a minority of the people. These con-
cerns are irrelevant to the FAS proposal because the decision to approve or not to approve a first-
use of nuclear weapons can hardly be characterized as one which invites special or parochial inter-
ests to predominate over national interest. Second, even if there might be certain groups or states
which have unique interests-such as states which could be likely candidates for enemy retaliation
because they host nuclear weapons sites-the process for selection of committee members would
not allow the kind of special interest domination that could occur in other contexts. The FAS
proposal specifies who the committee members must be according to offices in the House and
Senate. The committee, therefore could not be targeted for infiltration by senators and congress-
men whose sole concern is the representation of a local or special interest.
134. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 949.
135. Id. at 949-50.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 947.
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for abuse of war power was the subject of lively discussion at the conven-
tion1 3 8 and was examined in the Federalist. 139 The careful attention paid to
the "declare war" language by the Framers'"' demonstrates their concern
that the President's powers be checked so that he would only be able to
commit troops without a declaration of war in response to "sudden
attacks."'
4 1
In the usual case, then, bicameralism serves to check the President in
the exercise of the war powers. Indeed, the "sudden attacks" exception
would release the President from the bicameralism check in exigent circum-
stances not unlike those from which Congress would seek an exception in
the first-use proposal. 142 Furthermore, since the ratification of the Consti-
tution, history has demonstrated that the legislative branch has evidenced
no inherent "hydraulic pressure . . . to exceed the outer limits of its
power" 41 in the area of foreign affairs and war. Indeed, quite the opposite
has been true.'" Thus the concern about curbing the legislative powers,
which in part motivated the Framers' decision to require bicameral action,
is of limited relevance in the foreign affairs and war powers context.
A second purpose for which the Framers adopted the bicameralism re-
quirement was to assure "that the legislative power would be exercised only
after opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings." '45 The
Chadha opinion quotes Justice Story's characterization of the Framers'
fears concerning the propensity of the legislative branch for hasty and ill-
considered action: "If [a legislature] feels no check but its own will, it
rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a question long enough under
its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and relations to soci-
ety."' 46 Thus, the Framers opted for a time-consuming, "step-by-step, de-





Again, however, the exercise of legislative power in the area of war pow-
ers, and more particularly a first-use decision, is distinguishable. It is true
that the Framers saw the requirement of approval by both houses 4 as part
of a "system [which] will not hurry us into war." ''  Nevertheless, the real-
ity of modern warfare demands that certain decisions to commit or not to
commit America into hostilities be made with greater dispatch than other
legislative decisions. Consequently, in modern times, even when Congress
does adhere to strict bicameralism in making emergency national security
138. Witness the clamor following delegate Butler's suggestion that the President be given power to
declare war. A. SOFAER, supra note 3, at 31. See id., at 27 and 31 on the fears of convention
delegates such as Pinckney, Gerry and Mason concerning presidential abuse of war power.
139. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 26 and 69 (A. Hamilton); A. SOFAER, supra note 3, at 42-44.
140. See A. SOFAER, supra note 3, at 27-31.
141. Id. at 31.
142. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982).
143. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
144. See S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
145. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
146. Id. at 949-50 (quoting Justice Joseph Story in I J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 383-84 (3d ed. 1858)).
147. Id. at 959.
148. The suggestion that the Senate alone should have the power to declare war was rejected at the
Convention. A. SOFAER, supra note 3, at 31.
149. Id. at 52 (quoting Wilson, 2 Elliot Debates (Iredell) 528).
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decisions, it often does not, and cannot, "insist upon holding a question long
under its own view."'
' 50
As the Supreme Court has recognized, an appreciation that one impor-
tant purpose of the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense"''I
should foster an attitude of realism concerning matters of national safety. 
152
More importantly, the concern that the allocation of powers between Con-
gress and the President "not hurry us into war," while often served by the
requirement of bicameral approval, may be better served by excepting the
first-use context from the formal requirement. In the present uncertain
political and constitutional climate, the absence of explicit legislation on the
first-use context makes it possible that the President may unilaterally
choose to initiate a nuclear attack. Because such a decision would most
assuredly be an "act of war,"' 53 the elasticity retained by the "emergency"
clause in the War Powers Act is inadequate to assure a congressional role in
the first-use decision. Assuming that Congress would not impose the first-
use prohibition without the release mechanism, the release mechanism fur-
thers the bicameralism purpose by providing at least some debate, and per-
haps restraint, that would not otherwise exist.
It is important to remember that a procedure such as the committee
approval mechanism in the first-use proposal does not give the power to one
"man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress," '154 which was
the Framers' greatest fear. Rather, the FAS proposal insures, in a realistic
way, that at least representatives of two different branches-the President
and a committee composed of members from both houses-concur before
the nation can be involved in the distress entailed by a nuclear first strike.
The Framers' concern that "nothing but our national interest can draw us
into a war"'155 is realistically honored and the Chadha majority's interest in
dividing power and insuring fuller deliberation'56 is met, even though bi-
cameralism, in the strictest formal sense, is not followed and probably can-
not be followed.
Separation of Powers
Many commentators on Chadha have lamented its broad sweep as
seemingly negating 200-plus existing legislative veto provisions.' 57 While
many of what have been characterized as veto provisions suffer from formal
150. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 (quoting Justice Story, supra note 146). For example, World War II was
authorized by Congress on the same day as the Pearl Harbor attack; and the Formosa Resolution
was passed under expedited procedures which did not admit "full study and debate." W. REVELEY
III, supra note 3, at 126.
151. U.S. CONST., preamble.
152. Lichter, 334 U.S. at 742, 782 n.34.
153. See Stone, supra note 12, at 103-04.
154. Wilson, 2 Elliot, Debates 528 (Iredell), quoted in A. SOFAER, supra note 3, at 52, n. 198.
155. Id.
156. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
157. There is evidence, however, that Congress is both finding ways around Chadha and, in some in-
stances, apparently simply ignoring the holding. See generally Horan, Of Train Wrecks, Time
Bombs, and Skinned Cats: The Congressional Response to the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 13 J.
LEGis. 22 (1986). The Congressional Research Service has reported that the legislative veto "is
alive and well," sometimes in new informal and nonstatutory forms, sometimes in forms indistin-
guishable from the veto thrown out in Chadha. See L. FISHER, ONE YEAR AFTER INS V.
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Article 1 defects, some, such as the first-use proposal, do not offend and
may actually facilitate the purposes which are sought to be achieved by the
separation of powers.15 8 Generally, separation of powers has been inter-
preted to prohibit arrogations of power by one branch of government which
disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, 9 or prevents
one of the branches from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions. 6 Unlike the legislative veto, the committee approval procedure is
not an attempt to perform the executive function of the "execution or inter-
pretation of laws after enactment. 1 61 It is true that the joint committee
would exercise discretion in arriving at its decision concerning whether to
lift the congressionally-imposed prohibition on first use. However, this dis-
cretion is properly characterized as congressional deliberation of the kind
that would accompany any exercise of Congress' war powers. Further-
more, lifting a congressionally imposed prohibition on first use could not be
considered an executive prerogative.
There is, of course, the additional separation of powers question as to
whether the proposed first-use legislation would intrude upon any of the
President's Article II war powers. But any objection that the first-use legis-
lation intrudes upon the executive's war powers would be relevant not to
the subsequent release mechanism but to the initial prohibition. 62 The
committee release mechanism, when actually exercised, would not be an
attempted derogation of presidential power but, on the contrary, an expres-
sion of congressional approval of presidential first use. As such, the release
mechanism actually empowers the President and is not an intrusion upon
executive power.
One way to decide whether the usurpation threat central to our separa-
tion of powers is present in the first-use proposal is to ask whether Congress
would want to grant the power without the opportunity to check it.'63 If
the answer is "no," the proposal grants power to the President that he
would otherwise not have. Such an analysis focuses on the trade off be-
tween the efficiency gained by the shared power arrangement and the
chance that formal constitutional prescriptions for preventing tyranny are
being violated. Moreover, the committee approval mechanism is con-
structed so as to remove any threat to executive power. If Congress has the
power to impose the initial prohibition, the committee mechanism does em-
power the President. As Justice White said, dissenting in Chadha, the use
of a veto device in the war powers area allows Congress to "transfer greater
authority to the President . . . while preserving its own constitutional
role."'"
CHADHA: CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS, (Cong. Research Serv. 1984); see
also L. FISHER, supra note 107, at 181-83.
158. See generally Strauss, supra note 83.
159. Nixon v. General Services Administration, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
160. Id., citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974).
161. CRAIG, supra note 94, at 8 (emphasis added).
162. This issue is beyond the scope of the discussion of the constitutionality of the committee
mechanism.
163. See Strauss, supra note 83, at 791-92.
164. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 969 (White, J., dissenting).
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It bears mentioning here that separation of powers is far from a unitary
concept. At least three discrete reasons for separation were considered by
our Framers, and there is evidence that all three-forestalling tyranny, in-
suring the government's legitimacy, and promoting efficiency-resulted in
the separation which found its way into the Constitution. 165 Furthermore,
because the Constitution does not explicitly refer to a rule for separation of
powers, 166 the search for the rule's requirements in a given instance is often
elusive, particularly when the potentially competing dictates of the tyranny
and efficiency reasons for separation point toward opposite outcomes in a
separation controversy. 167 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has at times
obfuscated the meaning of separation of powers by downplaying the impor-
tance of one reason for separation to better support an outcome which relies
upon another reason for separation. 161 Chadha is a good example: The
Framers' concern with efficiency was distorted to a low profile in order to
stress the protections from tyranny which would come from literal adher-
ence to presentment and bicameralism.
Even if the committee approval mechanism is characterized as a legisla-
tive veto, it may, unlike the Chadha veto and perhaps other vetos of admin-
istration, actually enhance the goals of separation of powers. This may be
seen in four ways. First, little, if any, danger of aggrandizement of legisla-
tive power exists because the mechanism is a grant of power to the Presi-
dent. The initial prohibition and the release may best be viewed as a
congressional decision to provide a check on an historically unchecked uni-
lateral executive power. 69 Moreover, because the war powers language is
vague and because either elected branch may credibly make a claim in the
area, such a structuring of responsibilities clarifies the Constitution. Fur-
ther, tyranny may be more likely without the prohibition and release be-
cause the President may elect to bypass Congress on a first-use matter.
Second, it is unlikely that the imposition of these new responsibilities
upon selected members of Congress would interfere with their ability to
perform their constitutionally-required duties. 7 ° Although the commit-
tee's deliberations would be necessarily secret and sensitive, and perhaps
quite taxing, the episodic nature of the committee's function assures that
the members' legislative work would be accomplished. Thus, even if the
committee is given the unlikely characterization as performing an "execu-
tive" function, the separation of powers interest in getting the business of
government done is not offended. 7'
Third, the release mechanism may substantially further the efficiency
165. See generally GWYNN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1962).
166. The closest thing to an explicit statement of separation of powers in the Constitution is the alloca-
tion of powers among the three branches in the three articles. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1; art.
II, § 1, cl. 1; art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
167. See Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV.
715, 723-30 (1984).
168. Id. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
169. See supra note 144.
170. See In re Application of the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME. Subpoena




values which loomed large at the Constitutional Convention.1 72 History
reveals that efficiency, getting the important work of government accom-
plished effectively, was as important to the Framers as either of the other
reasons for separation of powers. 173 While the Court has been remembered
more for those instances where it denied or downplayed this efficiency value
in separation disputes, 174 the relatively few separation disputes which have
been decided serve as a reminder that the efficiency value encourages ac-
commodation and cooperation among the branches. In the context of the
shared war powers, the committee release mechanism may be the most ef-
fective way to make a first-use decision, as compared to a unilateral decision
by the President or full bicameral action by Congress. So viewed, the whole
government gains in its effectiveness and loses nothing.175
Finally, the avoidance-of-tyranny rationale-which is often manifested
in what is called "our system of checks and balances"-would be enhanced
by this check on the President, especially where otherwise none might ex-
ist.176 Indeed, support for the committee approval mechanism may be
found in one of the most important separation disputes-Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 177 In holding that President Truman's seizure of
the steel mills without statutory authority exceeded the President's consti-
tutional power, the Court relied on evidence that Congress had recently
considered, but then rejected, the idea of granting him the authority he had
exercised. 17 Thus, where the powers in question are concurrent, in the
"zone of twilight,"' 179 congressional intent may be effectively expressed to
curtail presidential action by measures short of legislation. So long as Con-
gress has power to control the President in such an area by statute, allowing
a less formal expression of congressional intent helps insure that some
check on presidential power exists. If the power which the President has in
"the twilight zone" may be controlled only by statute, a mere one-third of
either chamber can thwart the legislative will.180 While it is true that
Youngstown did not look to a committee for its evidence of congressional
intent, it is not much different in principle to do so by recognizing the legiti-
macy of a streamlined device for congressional participation in the first-use
decision than to look to legislative history to examine the reasons why Con-
gress did not enact legislation.
CONCLUSION
Given the risks of human fallibility in a one person decision and the
risks to the nation's survival of a nuclear war, good sense suggests that a
momentous decision such as first use of nuclear weapons be shared. The
urgency which compels quick action, such as deciding whether to fire nu-
172. See generally Banks, supra note 167.
173. Id. at 720-23.
174. Id. at 723-30.
175. See Strauss, supra note 83, at 812, 815.
176. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
177. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 586.
179. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
180. See Watson, supra note 107, at 1084-86.
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clear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack, is not present in a first-use
scenario. Further, since the conflict into which nuclear weapons would be
introduced would have so far been one fought with conventional weapons,
any lost time would not threaten the nation's continued survival in the way
a nuclear attack could. The Committee mechanism for first-use decisions
would involve Congress in a most important national decision, yet it would
preserve the need for speed and secrecy required by the situation. In some
sense, it is a compromise. Even so, it may be more effective than either of
the polar alternatives of unilateral executive power or full bicameral in-
volvement. The committee could engender the tough and independent crit-
icism of the technical reports and factual or political assumptions which
would be leading the President to favor the nuclear attack. Furthermore,
no single President, too deeply involved, could drag the nation into a nu-
clear holocaust. For the first time, Congress would necessarily be a part of
the decision-making process of nuclear weapons use issues.
